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EXCISE

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CORRECTION: 10/11/61

Control: 4516

Rec'd: October 7, 1961

6+10 pm

Info

FROM: PARIS - CORRECTED PAGE 1 AND PAGE 2

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: POLTO 456, OCTOBER 7, 2 PM

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PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT POLTO 456, INFORMATION LONDON POLTO 102, BONN POLTO 99, MOSCOW POLTO 79, BERLIN POLTO 61.

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RE BERLIN

DURING PAST WEEK, I HAVE HAD A COUPLE OF TALKS WITH HE ALLOWED HE WAS NOT KEPT FULLY INFORMED BY HIS PEOPLE, AND THAT HE WAS TALKING ONLY PERSONALLY. NEVERTHELESS FOLLOWING POINTS EMERGED AS HIS THOUGHTS:

- 1) KHRUSHCHEV HAD GOTTEN WHAT HE WANTED BY AUGUST 13 EVENTS, SINCE BY ACCEPTING THE WALL WEST ACCEPTED DIVISION OF GERMANY AS A FACT.
- 2) WEST BERLIN CANNOT LONG REMAIN VIABLE.
- 3) KHRUSHCHEV WILL NOT SEEK EXTRA DIVIDENDS, INCLUDING WEAKENING OF GFR ATTITUDE TOWARD HER PRINCIPAL ALLIES.
- 4) HE FEARS ACCESS ARRANGEMENTS WITH GDR WILL CONSTITUTE DE FACTO RECOGNITION.
- 5) GERMAN OPINION WILL REACT VERY STRONGLY IF WEST PUTS FORWARD IDEA OF FREE CITY OF WEST BERLIN.
- 6) TALK OF EUROPEAN SECURITY IS ANATHEMA, SINCE WOULD LEAD TO

SECRET

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO	ACTION TAKEN	
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OFFICE SYMBOL		

10/11/61 456
 762.058/10.761

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INCOMING :
TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL 4516

CORRECTION ISSUED 10/11/61 8 PM

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DEMILITARIZATION GFR.

I REPORT THIS FOR WHAT IT MAY BE WORTH, BUT POINTS 3, 5, AND 6 SEEM IMPORTANT TO ME.

IN SAME CONNECTION, [] EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN TO DURBROW (LX)(1)1.36(X)9
ABOUT GERMAN ATTITUDE ON GERMAN QUESTIONS. SAID HE PARTICULARLY
WORRIED THAT GERMANS ARE PLAYING THIS IN WHAT MAY BE OMINOUS
LOW KEY. (NOTE: [] USUALLY WELL-INFORMED ON GERMAN (LX)(1)1.36(X)9
THINKING). SAYING HE HAD NOT HAD CHANCE TO THOROUGHLY STUDY
REPORT THIRD RUSK-GROMYKO TALK. [] ASKED DURBROW "IS (LX)(1)1.36(X)9
AMERICA CHANGING ITS POLICY?" DURBROW SAID NO.

[] HAS TWICE SOUGHT ME OUT TO EXPRESS HIS (LX)(1)1.36(X)9
DISTRESS AT [] REJECTION OF HIS STRONG RECOMMENDATION (LX)(1)1.36(X)9
TO DISCUSS EUROPEAN SECURITY IN NATO.

[] HAS EXPRESSED PERSONAL CONCERN AT REACTIVATION OF (LX)(1)1.36(X)9
EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUE AND WONDERS IF US POSITION CHANGED
ON LINK BETWEEN SECURITY AND PROGRESS ON REUNIFICATIONS.

NOTHING, IN MY VIEWS, CAN BE MORE DAMAGING TO FEELING OF
SOLIDARITY THAN ATMOSPHERE OF UNCERTAINTY. FRANK CONSULTATION
IN NAC IS OBVIOUS CURE FOR THIS. THERE IS AMPLY PRECEDENT
1955, 1958 (SPECIAL NAC COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY) AND
1959 FOR FULL NATO STUDY OF THIS.

OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES RECOGNIZE FULLY THAT FORWARD DEFENSE OF
EUROPE DEPENDS ON FULL GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN NATO. WITHOUT
FULL DEFENSE IF GFR, WHICH GIVES REQUIRED DEPTH, NATO WOULD
BE IRRESISTIBLY PUSHED TO PERIPHERAL STRATEGY, WHICH IS IN-
ADMISSABLE AS BASIS FOR CONTINUATION OF ALLIANCE. WITHOUT
GFR CONFIDENCE IN ALLIES, PRESSURE FOR ACCOMMODATION WITH
COMMUNISTS MAY ARISE, OR AT LEAST "ONE WHICH" MAY BE HEARD
AGAIN, OR SO OUR NATO COLLEAGUES FEAR.

[] ARGUMENTS THAT ITALY AND CANADA (DEPTEL 1953) WILL (LX)(1)1.36(X)9
SEEK PARTICIPATION IN FOUR POWER GROUP ARE UNSOUND AND
IRRELEVANT.

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IRRELEVANT. NOR IS NATO OBSERVER IN WASHINGTON GROUP THE ANSWER. IN MY VIEW, CONFIDENCE CAN BE REINFORCED--ESPECIALLY IF WE TAKE PROMPT INITIATIVE--TO INSTITUTE CONSULTATION ON THESE KEY POLITICAL ISSUES IN NAC, GIVING OUR ALLIES A CHANCE TO BE HEARD IN ADVANCE AND DENYING ANY OPPORTUNITY FOR ANYONE TO CLAIM WE ARE MOVING OVER THEIR HEADS. ALL THIS IS OF IMPORTANCE WITH RESPECT TO BRINGING THEM WITH US REGARD TO ANY NEGOTIATION, OR IF NEGOTIATIONS FAIL, WITH REGARD TO FIGHTING OVER OUR RIGHTS IN BERLIN, OR IN THE LONGER TERM--STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM.

FINLETTER

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